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Introduction
The decision of the President Bush administration to attack Iraq exposed deep fissures in the American
populace. In the months prior to the so-called “Attack on Iraq” the American homefront had been
conceptualized as the site of two counter-poised political discourses – with the political right invoking
terrorist discourses to justify the attack on Iraq and the political left invoking humanitarian discourses to
protest the nation’s mobilization for war. Although it is fair to say that the two discourses emerged from two
distinct sets of concerns, what tends to be overlooked is their points of intersection and the unique historical
vision – what might be called the new American dream – that is emerging at this crossroads. 
This particular crossroads is occurring at a particularly sensitive time. It is occurring in the aftermath
of 9/11 – an event which evoked the question “why us?” and, as a result, raised deeper questions pertaining
to the American identity and way of life. It is also occurring at a time when the inter-national order itself is
coming under intense questioning and strain – i.e., when the language of an inter-national realm, which
presupposes that autonomous sovereign states are the major actors on the world stage, no longer fits. In these
ways, the domestic dispute over the situation in Iraq is eerily reminiscent of a crossroads produced hundreds
of years ago in Spain as a result of the encounter between the Spaniards and the Amerindians after the
discovery of America. According to Beate Jahn, the Amerindians posed a threat to the “culturally specific
world view of the Spaniards” which was resolved by two disparate responses, one based on assimilation and
the other on conquest.1 While seemingly incommensurable, Jahn argues that the two disparate discourses
actually worked together to create a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between the Amerindians
who embodied a state of nature or pre-civil form of society and the Europeans who embodied civilization’s
most advanced cultural form. It was this understanding of ‘the difference’ that solidified the view of states
as ‘hard shells’ demarcating firm and inalienable boundaries between Us and Them; Inside and Outside; and
Order and Anarchy. It also served as a foundation for European political thought which deemed the pursuit
of notions of the good life based on a legitimate political community as possible within states, but not
without – where a state of nature or the laws of the jungle reigned supreme. Hence, at a time in which the
old form of world order was being dismantled (but the new had not yet taken its place), a settled
understanding of difference began to crystallize as the by-product and enabling condition of two very distinct
sets of concerns, that of the state-maker (seeking to subjugate the new lands and its people to his will) and
that of the Jesuit (seeking to convert the barbarians to Christianity). This uneasy coming together ultimately
enabled the birth of a new inter-national state system – one created according to culturally-specific European
understandings of themselves and world order. 
My research question concerns the following: If the competing European discourses which
underpinned the emergence of the Westphalian state system reveal something about the ideas of Europeans
who produced them, what might current fissures in the American populace tell us about the desires, hopes,
and ambitions coming to play in the present interregnum? What interests me is not so much the outcome of
the dispute between these competing ‘social forces,’ but rather the field of vision that is being produced in
the spaces between. Unlike the previous resolution which contained the problem of difference within states,
current discourses seem to suggest that the global spaces housing an absolute Other are shrinking and that
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the boundaries between Us and Them are increasingly transcending state forms. How are these current images
and visions being played out with regards to the American domestic debate over the war in Iraq? What
understandings of difference or geopolitical space are being crystallized at the points of intersection and what
understandings are being eclipsed or left behind? More generally, I wonder what precursors for the future
world order may be found at the current historical crossroads that is, in part, signified by the Battle for Iraq.
To be clear, none of this has much to do with the actual events occurring on the ground in Iraq – which may
or may not unsettle these discursive frameworks. Rather, I want to know what American dream(s) does the
Battle for Iraq enable? And what implications does this have for those of us who, in various ways, may be
left to live the American dream?
The bulk of my analysis in this paper is based on the news coverage of the liberal mainstream press
– specifically the coverage of the antiwar protests and debates in the New York Times in the months leading
up to and including the early days of the Attack on Iraq. It was during this time that questions about how best
to secure the post-9/11 world and questions about America’s ‘rightful’ role in this world were the subject
of many debates. But, arguably, by the time that the Iraq debate was making media headlines, important
questions about the referent object of security – whether it be the American homeland, Western civilization
or, as I will suggest, borrowing from Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen and Richard Johnson, a way of life that
encompasses and exceeds both of these – were already settled. The only issue remaining was how best to
secure it. However, this issue is not the primary concern of this paper; its main concern, in fact, is how the
debate became constructed in this particular way.  Thus, rather than starting with the lead-up to the Gulf War,
when certain foundations had already been established that would shape the parameters of the debate, my
paper will begin in the period prior. It will begin in immediate post-9/11 period when meanings were still
being assigned – meanings which would give coherence to all that had happened previous to 9/11 and that
which would follow (specifically the Attack on Iraq). 
What I call the Battle for Iraq was not a singular debate, but, in fact, encompassed a number of issue
areas: It was a battle about how best to extend the liberal democratic peace to a ‘rogue’ state or, to use the
missionary language of our times, it was about extending the light of civilization to the dark corners of the
globe. It was about securing market access, resources, global commerce, and economic growth. It was about
making the world safe for democracy and the American way of life. It was about bringing freedom to the
Iraqi people. And it was also about re-asserting American primacy across the globe. As this list demonstrates,
spaces were created for the often conflicting interests of both state-makers and humanitarians – i.e., our
modern-day Jesuits. Indeed, both came to the forefront of this debate.
Yet, what strikes me more than the ways that their concerns clashed are the ways in which they
merged. Even the massive and vociferous antiwar demonstrations did little to upset this nexus. Within the
peace movement, the very object of the Bush Administration’s security discourse was cast outside the
legitimate realm of debate; only the means used to secure it was up for discussion. As a result, the defence
of the peace actually re-affirmed the evolving status quo by downplaying civic tensions threatening the
American identity pre-9/11 and by refusing to acknowledge the violent, ambitious terrorist Other that exists
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within the American identity and way of life. This paper will focus on these omissions and the violences and
ambitions that the American dream of a transcendent liberal democratic peace betrays. This paper seeks to
interrogate the peace.
The argument will proceed as follows: First, it will interrogate the meanings assigned to the ‘event’
of 9/11 in the days and weeks following the terrorist attacks on American soil. Then it will investigate the
arguments and concerns deployed by the anti-war and pro-war camps in the months leading up to the Attack
on Iraq. Lastly, it will argue that at the intersection of these disparate concerns a cohesive vision emerged,
even if just momentarily, of a new world order. Part fantasy, part reality, and held together as much by
intersubjective imaginings as by any concrete forces in the world, this vision is what I call the American
dream. It is a culturally-specific worldview put into practice by those with the power and the self-designated
authority (i.e., ‘responsibility’) to do so. 
The Event of 9/11
As stated, I will begin by querying the event of 9/11 itself – as it is this modern day encounter between
‘civilization’ and ‘the barbarians’ that has, for better or worse, become a defining event of present times. I
myself have likened the event, in this paper, to the encounter between the Spaniards and Amerindians. This
is because both instances or encounters have been interpreted as a rupture – “represented as an irruption on
the surface of history, announcing a break with a taken-for-granted world” – and thus serve as signifying
benchmarks in the periodization of history.2 While the death of the old Westphalian system has been
alternatively lamented or celebrated for quite some time, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (yet
another momentous event), the content of the new world order to take its place has failed to acquire a fixed
shape and, indeed, the post-Cold War (dis)order can be characterized as one of flux. This, of course, is not
to say that the events of 9/11 occurred at a time when the world itself was a blank slate. To the contrary, it
would be more apt to describe 9/11 as the empty vessel that was quickly filled with the already existing
ambitions, dreams, and desires of what the new will or must be.
As Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen points out, the “brute facts” of 9/11 did not speak for themselves:
“[T]here was little hard evidence as to why al-Qaida chose the World Trade Center as its target for the 11
September attacks.”3 Certainly, the question repeatedly raised in the American media, “Why would anyone
do this to us?” points to the ontological challenges that 9/11 posed to the present world (dis)order and to the
‘us’ that was under attack. Pondering such questions, Couze Venn says, “Events, retroactively, are made to
play the part of a new beginning and origin, which means that they oblige us to think anew the present and
who ‘we’ are.”4 Even prior to the contentious “Attack on Iraq,” which in my opinion became the focal point
of debates considering the question of what exactly was at stake in the constructions of the new, certain
narratives explaining the events of 9/11 were discarded and others began to crystallize – giving meaning and
coherence to the ‘brute facts.’
Quickly discarded, for example, was the idea that the attack on the World Trade Center was the mere
work of Islamic fundamentalists and could be explained by Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”
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thesis.5 This controversial argument, first published in 1993, asserts that the defining conflict of the Cold War
period was being replaced by civilizational conflicts in which the West – the “highest cultural grouping” held
in common by peoples primarily of North American and Western European descent – was at odds with “The
Rest.”6 According to this view, the Muslim population, religion, and culture is, by definition, a threat to the
liberal, secular, cosmopolitan values of the West and vice versa. But, despite the initial appeal that this
argument held for some in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center’s collapse, it was soon
employed by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair as an example of a position to reject.7
Indeed, according to Rasmussen, the preferred view of world leaders which ultimately gained
widespread acceptance, was that the processes of (Western) globalization had transcended particular
regional, national, cultural, religious, and civilizational differences – incorporating the whole of humanity
within its realm:
Globalization showed the transcendence of the Cold War world in favour of a ‘new world
order’ governed by the values of democracy, market economy and civil society by which the
West defined itself and human progress. Hence, globalization became a late-modern,
sociological name for the ‘civilizing process’, which according to the Western mind
gradually improves the human condition, civilization, by transcending its own achievements
in favour of something increasingly better. In other words, Western victory in the Cold War
had allowed it to define the world on its own terms and given it reason to believe that the
world in due course would become more like the West.8 
The World Trade Center then was a prime target because it symbolized no less than globalization and the
promise of human progress contained within.9 The consequences of this view for the conceptualization of
world order were significant. It irrevocably challenged any remaining notions of a world characterized by
hard and inalienable borders between states where politics characterized the relations within states and a state
of nature/anarchy/chaos was the defining feature of relations without. The state of nature was both
transcended and still firmly at the heart of this new narrative of International Relations. 
Indeed, the threats of barbarism and chaos were larger than ever. They were precisely what
globalization needed to defend itself against! But, now these threats lie within. The (spatial and temporal)
distances between the wild and safe zones had collapsed:
The flows from the wild zones of people, risks, substances, images, Kalashnikovs and so on,
increasingly slip under, over and through the safe gates, suddenly and chaotically
eliminating the invisibilities that had kept the zones apart. Through money laundering, the
drug trade, urban crime, asylum-seeking, arms trading, people smuggling, slave trading and
urban terrorism, the spaces of the wild and the safe are chaotically juxtaposed.10
Tellingly, the plans to attack the World Trade Center and the attacks themselves did not originate
from the third world in a conventional sense of the term, but from what Rasmussen describes as “third world
space[s]” in the first world.11 Zygmunt Bauman describes the lessons learned from 9-11 as follows: “We are
all ‘inside’, with nothing left outside. Or, rather, what used to be ‘outside’ has entered the ‘inside’ – without
knocking and settled there – without asking permission.12 Rather un-ironically, the very processes, networks,
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communication systems, and global civilian infrastructure that made globalization possible are the same
processes, networks, communications, and infrastructure that make it possible for the “barbarians” to
penetrate the safe zones, to project power globally, and to inflict harm on the powerful.13 The choice of al-
Qaida to seize on the new strategic possibilities posed by globalization only confirmed and hastened newly
emerging understandings of global space that both conflicted with the clash of civilizations explanation of
terrorism and, as Rasmussen convincingly argues, fostered the conclusion that the threats of disorder and
terrorism are an inherent part of globalization itself. In contrast to the civilizing processes of globalization,
the events of 9/11 can then be described as signifying, in the words of George W. Bush, a “parallel
globalization of terror,”14 or, in the words of Colin Powell, the “dark side of globalization.”15 Terrorism, in
this narrative, is globalization’s alter ego.  
To the extent that terrorism was constructed within the frame of globalization itself, terrorist acts
(other than those of homegrown white boys like Timothy McVeigh) could not simply be dismissed as tragic,
albeit isolated, events – the work of lunatics or fringe fanatics. Rather, the terrorists were defined as an
existential threat – engaged in a struggle for the future of humanity itself. Says British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, “There is no compromise with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such
terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must.”16 According to a Washington Post
editorial written by Retired Air Force General Charles G. Boyd, what was at stake was no less than “freedom,
strength, tolerance and democratic principles dedicated to liberty and peace”17– in short, a way of life that
while quintessentially American was in the process of transforming/civilizing the globe. In the words of R.C.
Longsworth, a columnist with the Chicago Tribune, “Most Americans see their nation and its ideals as benign
and positive, and they assume that these ideals…democracy, a free economy, consumerism, untrammeled
communications, tolerance, equality between the sexes…can only benefit the rest of the world. It’s a shock
to learn that not everyone wants to become like us.”18 And yet, as his article and countless other reports in
the American media go on to conclude, this is the “harsh reality” forced on Americans in an age of
terrorism.19
In a similar vein, for example, Sean Hannity of Fox News Channel asked, “Are Americans afraid to
face the reality that there is a significant portion of the world’s population that hates America, hates what
freedom represents, hates the fact that we fight for our freedom world wide, hates our prosperity, hates our
way of life?”20 More interesting than the answer to the question is that which gets expelled from
consideration in this dichotomized world view of freedom-lovers – which, according to Prime Minister Blair,
encompasses “states from all continents, people of all faiths, and parties of all democratic political
persuasions” –  and freedom-haters.21 On the one hand, as Richard Johnson points out, all of the violence and
blood shedding of the American past are forgotten:
As we would expect in discourses of fundamentalist moral certainty, the enemy, the
terrorist, is absolutely external and other. It can have no past, have no connection with a
longer history of relationships in which Britain or the U.S. could be complicit. As Blair puts
it, “this mass terrorism is the new evil in the world.” (Blair, 2 Oct.) Bush says that America
is “learning about terror and evil” (Bush, 24 Oct.) as though in U.S. history nothing like this
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has ever happened before – no gun crime, no electric chair, no Oklahoma City, no Kent
State University, no WACO, no lynching, no extermination of First Nations, no Vietnam…22
On the other hand, what is much less commented on and yet of more significance for the purposes
of this paper, is that it is not only the negative aspects of American culture that are forgotten - as they are
simultaneously projected onto the terrorist “evildoer.”23 Also forgotten are the Battle of Seattle, Fortress
Quebec, and the massive ‘anti-globalization’ protests in Genoa – instances in which the so-called ideals of
freedom-lovers, even Western capitalism and ‘American-style’ democracy themselves, came under scrutiny.
The critiques offered by the protesters – which seemed to be gaining currency in the period before September
11th (even with the mainstream media) – came not just from the ‘outside,’ in any sense of the word, but from
‘within’ the heart of civilization. 
September 11th, as it came to be understood, defused the radical potential of these critiques. In fact,
the problems of poverty, inequality, exploitation, and environmental degradation were no longer the problems
of globalization, Western capitalism, or American-style democracy per se. Instead the problem became the
question of how to harness the “bright” side of globalization24 – i.e., how to help the poor seize the
opportunities that globalization presented. These were seen as policy problems and ones that many in the
West felt particularly well poised to address. Tony Blair, for his part, was more than willing to take up the
cause of the poor and dispossessed:
The starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor,
from the deserts of northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of
Afghanistan: they too are our cause…This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been
shaken, the pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder the
world around us. Today, mankind has the science and technology to destroy itself or to
provide prosperity to all. Yet science can’t make that choice for us. Only the moral power
of a world, acting as a community, can. 25
Similarly, President Bush referred to the challenges posed by 9/11 as “the calling of the 21st Century”
and Americans, he promised, would rise to the occasion.26 According to Johnson, who analyzes the anti-
terrorist rhetorics of Bush and Blair in the post 9/11 period, Americans were encouraged to do this not by
retreating from their way of life, but by seizing it as a source of strength and inspiration…as an exemplary
to show the world. In part this involved continuing to work, travel, and shop – i.e., to be confident in who
we are and “to make sure that our economy continues to grow” and in part this involved showing the world
that Americans are a compassionate people “through…a million acts of responsibility and decency and
service.”27 In Bush’s speeches, the American way of life is not only beyond contestation; it is precisely that
which must be redeemed:
This country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America
is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the
world.28
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As these clips demonstrate, while President Bush often redrew the lines between ‘inside’ and
‘outside’ in very traditional ways – in ways that enabled him to interpellate ordinary Americans into a heroic
narrative of the ‘American nation’ – the cause Americans were being asked to rally behind was larger than
themselves and, in fact, larger than the Western world. 
Indeed, the American way of life that was being re-produced in these instances was consonant with
globalization and perhaps inextricable from it. In other words, the promise of human progress contained
within globalization could not be without the American way of life and the American way of life could not
be without globalization. Johnson argues that the speeches of Tony Blair and George Bush invite us to view
ways of life as a “complex [global] unity” and he comments on the significance of this shift:
This ‘unity’ is not ‘society’ or the ‘social formation’ any more – the nation, that is, in
disguise. Ways of living cannot be sustained as ‘national’ only. The whole world is now the
unity; the setting is global: there is one ‘world’ in the phenomenological or experiential
sense, one world in the geopolitical reach of power and communication, one earth as a bio-
social environment. But this unity is both complexly divided and interrelated in its
differences, in many different ways.29 
What is important to note is that despite these differences, the 21st Century calling heeded by George Bush,
was truly global. 
For a short time, the tensions resident within this new narrative (which my own paper struggles to
contain) were held at bay. The War on Afghanistan was a perfect example of this – i.e., a display of global
cooperation/transcendence seemingly under the banner “Freedom-Loving Peoples of the World Unite” and
sponsored, if you will, by the USA. But unanswered questions remained that had the potential to shake this
narrative to its core. In particular, there was the nagging aforementioned issue of how to harness the bright
side of globalization or how to extend globalization’s light into the pockets of darkness that threatened to
proliferate across the globe. The relatively unproblematic ‘defensive’ act of bombing Afghanistan was really
just the tip of the iceberg in this world where the spaces between the wild and safe zones had all but
collapsed. Although the question of how to make the world safe for globalization and safe for America was
seemingly little more than a strategic debate, in that the issue of what to securitize was already settled, deep
divisions could arguably re-expose fissures in the referent objects themselves. Globalization for whom?
Whose way of life? Who or what is worth sacrificing in the name of security? Security for what? These are
questions that, if raised, threatened to tear apart the problematic ‘we’ at the heart of the American way of life
– either within the territorial borders of the American state or writ large to encompass the ‘freedom-loving
peoples’ of the world. My interest is primarily in the former. More specifically, I am interested in questions
of how Americans came to understand themselves and their role in the world post-9/11 and post-encounter
with the new ‘Other.’ 
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i  Although the Internet increasingly functions both as a source of media and as a site for  identity construction, I
chose to focus on the liberal mainstream press primarily because I wanted to limit my focus to one specific type of
media and because unlike various Internet sites, I think that the New York T imes is uniquely placed as a seemingly
‘detached,’ ‘uninterested,’ ‘objective,’ or ‘credible’ (even if ever-so-slightly ‘liberal’) national newspaper. All of
these descriptors are, of course, highly problematic, but it is nevertheless this perception of the New York Times
and, likely, its self-designation as such, that made it a particularly interesting area of focus for me.
The Lead-up to War: Narrating Protest
In order to explore these questions, I have chosen to investigate the stories that the Americans told – about
themselves and about each other – in the period leading up to the Attack on Iraq. How do these stories
reinforce particular understandings of the American identity and the larger world and how do they exclude
others? Much of my analysis here is based on the news coverage of the liberal mainstream press –
specifically the coverage of the antiwar protests and debates in the New York Times from November of 2002
to April 2003. A media analysis was chosen because more than the actuality of the ‘events’ themselves, I am
interested in the narration of these events – i.e., how they came to be understood, interpreted, and re-
produced or challenged on the ground. Says Ronald Crelinsten: “The role of the media is crucial in that it
serves as the crucible within which public images and discourse are forged, shaped, and channeled into
particular themes and agendas.”30 I would add that it is also a site in which various subjectivities are forged,
a medium through which we come to recognize ourselves as actors (the antiwar protester, the radical, the
patriot, the humanitarian) and come to attach certain meanings to the identities we perform.i
The identities of interest to me here are that of the antiwar protester and that of the patriot – identities
which, in spite of important differences, in many ways merged in the lead-up to the Attack on Iraq. These
identities played a crucial role in the stories that emerged because it is in relation to them that the American
public was able to interpret and scrutinize their own responses to the debate. The debate itself centred
specifically on the relative merits of launching a pre-emptive attack against Iraq as a means of securitizing
the post-9/11 world. On the one side of this debate were antiwar protesters, who, while alternately demonized
or belittled by the right-wing media as enemies of the state or “leftist stooges,”31 were by and large depicted
as legitimate political actors with legitimate concerns by the mainstream liberal press. The New York Times
and even the Washington Post emphasized the diversity of the protesters whose ranks included some unlikely
allies such as “mothers, grandmothers, black and Latino organizations, unions…average ordinary
people…the National Council of Churches…[and] Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities.”32 Much
attention was placed on the breadth and depth of antipathy to a pre-emptive strike:
City and county councils in 20 states have passed [resolutions imploring President Bush to
slow down his confrontation with Iraq] from small towns like Woodstock, New York to
cities as large as Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. Many have liberal leanings…But
others…have large numbers of Republican voters.33 
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In the narration of the burgeoning antiwar movement that emerged from news stories like these, the
fact that the protesters’ ranks extended beyond the usual suspects – i.e., “fringe groups or leftovers from
Vietnam”34 – was often cited as evidence of the war protester’s credibility.
Indeed, comments such as those cited above tended to be followed by remarks that, while not
necessarily supportive, seemed to legitimate the antiwar protester’s concerns. Evelyn Nieves, columnist with
the Washington Post, participated in this process of legitimation: “Union members have the same concerns
as others opposed to the proposed war, including a belief that the Bush administration has not weighed the
economic consequences or made the case for unprecedented attack.”35
Others similarly tended to credit the antiwar protesters with raising critical questions pertaining to
“not just the use of force, but the cost of war.”36 The costs of war included, of course, the lives of American
soldiers as well as the suffering of Iraqis – particularly women and children.37 But, in the face of George
Bush’s massive tax cuts, it also included economic consequences, defined broadly, and specific concerns
about the war’s impact on social spending and domestic welfare. In the words of Chicago councilman Joe
Moore: “This war will be financed by deficit spending and drastic cuts in domestic spending. In either case,
my neighborhood and neighborhoods throughout the nation will suffer the consequences of a sagging
economy and even more cuts in federally funded projects and programs.”38 
These concerns, while recognized as legitimate, tended to be attributed to the ‘nervous mood’ of the
American populace. Mr. Baldassare, a pollster with the (American) Public Policy Institute, explains the link
between economic anxieties and views on war as follows: “People are in a kind of nervous mood I haven’t
seen since the early 1990s. They are very wary of the state’s vulnerable position economically right now.
That has made people cautious about things they might view as extraneous events, including going to war
with Iraq.”39
And yet, as David Halbfinger and Jacques Steinberg of the New York Times point out, this time the
American mood is “mixed with little of the national cockiness that many recall accompanied the prelude to
Desert Storm.”40 This time American vulnerability became the overriding theme of the day and the lens
through which the antiwar protesters’ concerns and perhaps the movement itself came to be interpreted.  
Indeed, much was made of the fact that the American homefront could no longer be presumed as
external to the conflict. Some soldiers expressed concerns about leaving their families to fight a war across
the ocean when the American homeland was under attack: “We used to fight wars only in foreign lands, but
it is not so anymore. I worry more about my family right here than about me over there. I know I am going
to protect myself. But my kid is 10 years old…And my wife, too.”41
The nation was jittery – under a code orange terror alert with heightened levels of security at public
gathering places and even places of work. People were afraid to open their mail because of the anthrax scare
and were buying duct tape in the event of a chemical or biological weapon’s attack. Civilians were, quite
literally, on their guard, having been asked to actively participate in the nation’s security efforts – to watch
for strange and suspicious behaviour and to call police if they noticed an unattended briefcase or lunch bag.
Says Ulrich Beck: “the terrorist has made everyone into a disaster movie scriptwriter, now condemned to
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imagine the effects of a home-made bomb assembled with the help of gene or nanotechnology; or the
collapse of global computer networks by the introduction of squads of viruses and so on.”42
In this climate, a number of Americans, concerned with how they would be perceived at home and
abroad, by potential terrorists within and by the international community at large, claimed to be motivated
by fear. The risk of provoking more terrorist attacks was, in the words of one father and protester, “one of
the most convincing arguments of the antiwar movements.”43 Others expressed a strong desire not to go it
alone. In fact, the backing of the United Nations was a significant determinant in many Americans’
willingness to support the war.44 Clearly, the national mood was in many ways unlike that of Desert Storm:
There [was] little excitement at the chance to put newfangled American weapons to the test,
few illusions about how costly a war could be in human life or material or money…[and]
concern that the government’s willingness to go it nearly alone, at a dear price in
international support, could prove fatal at a later date.45
In short, this was a time of doubt…a time of ontological insecurity. Rasmussen points out that as
opposed to the Mutually Assured Destruction of the Cold War period when “people in the East and West had
ontological security…albeit in a somewhat ironic form,”46 in the post-9/11 world the “enemy” was a vague
amorphous character who could not simply be deterred or contained: “The events of 11 September 2001
seemed to confirm the growing fears of the late 1990s that the strategic game had changed and that Western
governments did not quite know what the new rules were.”47 
Hence, for some Americans, the lingering question ‘Why do they hate us?’ was a pertinent security
matter that could not be answered merely by redrawing the lines between us and them. Interestingly, some
of those who claimed to be protesting out of fear attempted to bridge this gap by granting communicable
status to the terrorist, a potentially subversive act. Michael N. Nagler, the founder and former chairman of
the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at the University of California argued that the protest’s
significance may not lie in its ability to persuade President Bush or fellow Americans against going to war,
but in sending a message to potential terrorists: “This is going to penetrate the consciousness of some of the
people who hate us and make it harder to stereotype us. A key element in nonviolent struggle is risk. When
you are willing to take a risk it has a strong emotional impact on the other party.”48 
Protesters, like Professor Nagler, were conducting theater which is not unusual for protest
movements in and of itself. But, it is noteworthy that this performance was not aimed primarily at national
audiences, but at the world stage. It is also noteworthy that some protesters were trying to communicate with
those deemed by President Bush to be incommunicable.49 These are people who, in Bush’s words, “have no
country, no ideology,” “can only survive in darkness,” and whose “only motivation is evil.”50 By granting
communicative status to the terrorist ‘Other,’ these protesters, like the group Families for Peaceful
Tomorrows (which highlights the linkages between victims of 9/11 and the victims of civil war and US
bombing in Afghanistan), adopted a potentially subversive, self-conscious and reflexive posture. It demands
an awareness of how the American people and actions of the American government are perceived by others
and one which has the potential at least to re-cast the American identity as a question. But, the seemingly
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more radical challenge that these protesters posed went largely unnoticed in the New York Times. Comments
like Nagler’s did not disturb the overriding narrative of a peace movement largely driven by fear. The opinion
peace written by Bill Keller for the New York Times sums this narrative up best:
With our troops amassed against Iraq, Americans are apprehensive and divided. The polls
show us still torn between containment and war, between the instinct to give it time and the
yearning to get it done. We worry about civilian carnage, American casualties and terrorist
reprisals, about further shocks to a shaken economy, about being a nation alone. The
Pentagon is ordering body bags by the thousand…What most of all animates our national
anxiety, I think, is the fear that war will backfire. Most people did not imagine themselves
anywhere near the front line in 1991. Now the front line is where we live and we are
afraid.51
In this narrative, the concern for peace in and of itself may seem little more than a mere backdrop
for the more pragmatic national, economic, and social security issues that come to the fore, but it would not
be fair to dismiss the pacifist impulse all together. For one, even by the media accounts, this was hardly a
movement of all pragmatists. Describing what unites the various array of individuals who joined the antiwar
group by the name of Bronx Action – aside from the shared observation that they are not full-time protesters
(i.e., “they are mainly white, middle-class, middle-age and have full time jobs”) – Leslie Eaton says the
following: “Some describe themselves as pacifists. Others are more pragmatic…Many say they are both
pacifists and pragmatists.”52 What made the movement noteworthy (and from certain perspectives what made
it legitimate) was just the extent to which pragmatic and pacifist concerns came together. For another, an
interest in peace, or at least a desire not to participate in this particular war, was the common thread uniting
all the various Americans against war – hence, the names of the two largest umbrella groups co-ordinating
and organizing the protest effort were United for Peace and Justice and Win Without War. The fact that the
American mood can be characterized as one of vulnerability or apprehension does not discount the concerns
that many Americans raised. Perhaps for many it just highlighted the stakes involved in this particular war
which, in many ways, was laying a claim to the construction of the new – that which was being born out of
the World Trade Center’s ashes. In the words of one hand-made protest sign “Peace = Life. War = Death.
Let Us Choose Life.”53 For various reasons the antiwar protesters did. 
Srange Bedfellows - The Bush Administration and Liberal Humanitarians Gear up for War
But, this is not to say that the pro-war camp did not. And it is here that things get interesting. To understand
this it is necessary to understand the formally stated reasons for war and its ideological underpinnings. The
formally stated reason for launching a pre-emptive attack against Iraq (which was more exclusively focused
on in the early days of the pro-war campaign) was to forcefully disarm Iraq of its alleged Weapons of Mass
Destruction – weapons that Iraq was believed to be storing and producing in violation of United Nations’
resolutions. According to one Bush administration official, if anything was learned from 9/11 it was the need
to “be proactive to prevent threats from emerging” and WMD in the hands of Saddam Hussein fit the
definition of an emergent threat.54 Containment and deterrence were deemed to be out-dated and insufficient
Managhan g An Examination of the Identities and Fantasies (Re)Kindled in the Battle for Iraq / 12
responses to the new threats. The change was that rogue states no longer had to launch an attack from their
soil. Despite little compelling evidence, the fear was that Saddam Hussein could aid and abet a terrorist
attack either by directly sponsoring a terrorist organization and supplying them with weapons or by merely
selling weapons on the black market. Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, articulates this concern
as follows:
Containment and deterrence goes back to an era when the only use of force we were worried
about was one in which the use of force could be directly associated with a country, and that
country had an address. The whole thing that terrorists introduce is that you not only do not
see the threat coming but you do not know where it came from.55
What Mr. Wolfowitz does not say here is that the ambitions underpinning a pre-emptive attack against Iraq
pre-dated 9/11 by at least ten years.
Under the former Bush administration, Mr. Wolfowitz, acting in the capacity of an aide to then
Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, drafted a document known as the Defense Planning Guidance that made
the case that the administration should adopt a new foreign policy based on the doctrine of pre-emption. It
argued that this would allow the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to maintain its
military superiority and “enlightened domination” throughout the globe.56 A broad directive would
furthermore enable the United States to be “postured to act independently [or with ad-hoc assemblies of
nations] when collective action [with traditional allies] can not be orchestrated.”57 Hypothetical wars,
including a second war against Iraq, were also discussed in this proposed foreign policy framework – a
framework which was judged at the time to be “too bellicose” – but which seems to have gained favour with
the current administration.58
The significance of this is that it reveals that the current seeds for the post-9/11 world were planted
long before the event itself. The event may have provided the occasion to bring this framework to fruition,
but it is important to note that the old framework could not simply be inserted into the present
administration’s foreign policy agenda untouched. Other ideas were coming to fruition in the 9/11 period as
well and their influence shaped the overall foreign policy framework. Specifically, there was the matter of
the liberal democratic peace which had become transcendent as a result of the processes of globalization.
What sense did ambitions of military superiority make in this world? In part, this question has already been
answered: “Terrorism was seen as a challenge to the international order and the civilizing process of
globalization generated by that order.”59 In other words, military might was needed to make the world safe
for democracy. But this age-old refrain fails to illuminate the novel features that were occurring at this time.
The United States had declared a state of exception – a suspension of the old (rule of law) and the
implementation of the new. As the saying goes, exceptional measures are needed for exceptional times.
Arguably, there is little exceptional about this. It is and always has been a means by which states re-inscribe
their sovereignty and redraw the lines between inside and outside in a way that determines who is politically
subject.60 And yet, what made this event rather unique, if not exceptional, is that this time the state of
emergency that President Bush declared was global. Venn explains as follows:
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In the USA since September 11th, the suspension of law – inside the US applying to anyone
suspected of terrorism or of supporting it, and internationally – in phrases of the kind: “We
want Osama bin Laden dead or alive, preferably dead” instantiates the state of exception and
of the sovereignty of the USA with respect to all other states.61
In so doing, the United States re-cast itself as the exception.62 Its exceptional status derived from two factors.
The first was its unrivaled ability to project military power. The second, and no less important, was its status
as the bastion of freedom and democracy. Says Rasmussen, “Taken together the focus of decisive action and
Liberalism put the United States apart from the world as the strongest and freest society in the world.”63
Hence, the United States suspended international law – asserting its right to decide who the global terrorists
are and what measures are necessary to mitigate the terrorist threat – in order to save it.64 In the words of
George Bush, “The course we follow is a matter of profound consequence to many nations. If America
wavers the world will lose heart. If America leads, the world will show its courage. America will never
waver. America will lead the world to peace.”65 In this narrative, the United States is, in fact, the guardian
of world peace and order. As America leads the world through these exceptional times, the dichotomy
between its particular interests and those of the globe is perceived as false. This is the age of transcendence
when the United States morphs from a great power within an international order to the constituent force of
world order itself.66 Some would call this the age of Empire, but unlike the Roman or British Empire, this
modern day variant is much more concerned with the production of liberal subjectivities than with the
physical conquest of new lands.  
A defining characteristic of the age is that war is conducted in the name of humanity.  Humanitarian
concerns and war aims necessarily overlap and sometimes merge. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain
that “Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself, but on the basis of the capacity to present force as
being in the service of right and peace.”67 Certainly, as the Bush administration’s campaign for war against
Iraq proceeded, even in the face of large-scale protest, the humanitarian basis for war came to the fore in
Bush’s speeches:
I’ve listened carefully as people and leaders around the world have made known the desire
for peace. All of us want peace. The threat to peace does not come from those who seek to
enforce the just demands of the civilized world. The threat to peace comes from those who
flout those demands. If we have to act, we will act to restrain the violent and defend the
cause of peace. And by acting we will signal to outlaw regimes that in this century the
boundaries of civilized behavior will have to be respected. Protecting these boundaries
carries a cost. If war is forced upon us by Iraq’s refusal to disarm, we will meet an enemy
who hides his military forces behind civilians, who has terrible weapons, who is capable of
any crime. These dangers are real…Members of our armed forces also understand why they
may be called to fight…They know that America’s cause is right and just: the liberty of an
oppressed people and security for the American people.68
In this speech, President Bush does not deny or minimize the security interests of the United States. He
simply highlights that America’s cause is the cause of the civilized world. The liberal news media picked up
this theme as well, emphasizing the virtue of regime change in Iraq as a means of extending globalization’s
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civilizing forces to a pocket of the world still seeped in darkness. The links between global security and
regime change in Iraq was perhaps made most forcefully and repeatedly by the New York Times’ columnist
Thomas Friedman:
The war has two purposes – one stated, one unstated – but both require the same means. The
stated purpose is to disarm Iraq. The unstated purpose is to transform it from a totalitarian
system that has threatened its neighbors and its own people into something better...And it
can serve as a progressive model to spur reform – educational, religious, economic, and
political – around the Arab world…The unstated logic is that the real threat to open societies
today comes from all the angry young men and women being produced by the
misgovernance, backwardness, and extremism emanating from that part of the world. And
if that anger results in another 9/11 it will mean the end of open society as we know it, and
globalization as we know it…That is why helping the Arab-Muslim world get onto a
different course is the only meaningful response to 9/11.69
Friedman argues that transforming Iraqi society is a cause that “liberals should care about.”70 In part because
“liberating the captive people’s of the Mideast is a virtue in itself” and in part because what was being
defended was no less than the Western liberal ontology of today’s globalized world.71
Contrary to what some of the war’s critics may claim, this war was not only or even primarily about
territory or access to resources. (Although this is not to say that traditional geo-strategic factors did not play
an important role.) In an age of transcendence, such wars no longer made sense. This, according to analysis
and editorial commentary in the New York Times, is what the “cynical Europeans” just did not get.72 An
opinion poll by Pew Research Center found that solid majorities in key European constituencies (75 percent
in France, 54 percent in Germany and 76 percent in Russia) believed the American desire to invade Iraq was
motivated by oil-lust.73 And yet, despite the deep divisions in the American populace only 22 percent
subscribed to this view.74 How does one account for this? According to the commentary by Max Boot, the
difference reflects the European’s more jaded view of the world which stems from their own imperialist past:
“In the case of Iraq, they just can’t seem to accept that we might be acting for, say, the general safety and
security of the world.”75 Time and again American idealism emerged in various accounts defending American
intransigence in the face of massive domestic and global opposition to war. William Saffire, for example,
who seemed to be speaking to the war’s opponents directly, argued that citizens’ “reasonable fear should be
accompanied with a strong dash of hope”: 
Wilsonian idealists have found a soulmate in President Bush, who surprised all of us with
his challenging vision…making the world a safer place…But safety is not all…If Bush’s
vision of a transformed region fails, it will fail while daring greatly – a nobler course than
that weakly advocated, in Teddy Roosevelt’s words, by “those cold and timid souls who
know neither victory nor defeat.”76 
The message here was clear: despite any and all objections, the United States had a sacred duty to forcefully,
if necessary, transform the Iraq’s “pre-political” society into a modern democracy – i.e., to remake the globe
in its image.77 This was the 21st Century calling heeded by George Bush. Like earlier crusades, this liberal
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variant was based on the firmly held belief that the Western world had attained a higher level of cultural
advancement than the rest of the world – one that all rational peoples aspired to.  
Many self-professed ‘doves’ or ‘liberals,’ both of whom are typically affiliated with the politics of
the Left, also heeded the call and joined the pro-war camp. Some criticized the antiwar protesters for not
being humanitarian enough. One of these was New York writer and cultural critic Paul Berman who derided
the antiwar protesters for “not marching in support of the oppressed Iraqis.”78 He and others argued that there
was nothing contradictory about opposing the war in Vietnam and supporting war in Iraq because in both
cases the impulse was humanitarian.79 Well-known human rights scholar and activist, Michael Ignatieff made
a similar argument when explaining his support for war: “Being antiwar and antiuse of force was a kind of
defining signature of being a liberal, but that was 30 years ago. In the 90s, being a liberal meant being in
favour of military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Human rights has come into this and complicated the
picture considerably.”80 But, Ignatieff acknowledged that many of his friends were adamantly opposed to the
war. The conciliatory view, which came to predominate in the New York Times, was that both sides were
“genuinely high-minded”81 – even if the subtext suggested that the antiwar protesters were slightly
misguided. As stated in an OP-ED by Nicholas Kristoff, “one [side] is driven by horror of war and the other
by horror of Saddam.” What both share, however, is a “dream of Iraq that is democratic and an America that
is admired around the world.”82 
The New American Dream
This is what I call the new American dream, a sort-of refurbished “Manifest Destiny,” forged at the
crossroads of competing and conflicting humanitarian and security concerns. It was a dream (whether broadly
ascribed to or not) that brought together rights discourses, development discourses, and even the conduct of
war. In this dream all sides (not only, and sometimes not even primarily, that of the antiwar protester)
embraced the promise of life. Indeed, the war on Iraq was what might be referred to as a “biopolitical war”
– a war fought over the terrain of life or, perhaps equally paradoxically, the martial face of the liberal
democratic peace.83 Says Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, “While the advent of global liberal governance
is…associated with claims concerning the establishment and extension of liberal peace, it is frequently
overlooked that the biopolitics of global liberal governance has a martial face.”84 War typically tends to be
understood as the ‘other’ to peace, but, as Dillon and Reid describe and as this paper highlights, the two are,
in fact, now intimately connected: “Liberal humanitarians have, for example, become politicized,
geopolitically ambitious, and sometimes warlike in pursuit of liberal peace. They also have found themselves
in alliance with the institutions of international political and economic governance as well as branches of the
military.”85 War is a constituent element of the liberal democratic peace – involved in the production of new
and increasingly complex spatial configurations delineating the spaces between inside and out or where
politics gives way to the exception.86 Towards this end, the sovereign state remains a pivotal player in the
“organization and operation of international power, including that of contemporary liberal peace.”87 True,
the days of states as actors with the exclusive ability to project power globally, as per traditional realist
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accounts, have passed. Today (Western) states operate through the complex networks of global liberal
governance where they vie for power and collaborate with aid agencies, humanitarian organizations, the
United Nations, multinational corporations, the media, and other governmental and non-governmental
organizations to project power across the globe.88 And yet, what has become particularly evident since 9/11,
is the extent to which such states continue to have an instrumental role both in “developing the productive
powers of territory”89 and in the broader processes of constituting subjects who are amenable to the
technologies of governance or the “diverse ensemble of power”90 which I refer to above.
The War on Iraq illustrates this point well. This war was engaged in a complex process of re-
mapping that sought to extend the realm of global liberal governance by bringing new territory and people
within its sway. Venn argues that towards this end, “[t]he terrorist as a figure is the perfect enemy for the
global corporate order: deterritorialized, mobile, polysemic, universal, subsuming previous enemies.”91 Such
a figure not only enables the tentacles of power to have a new and extended reach in the name of security,
but it also makes an “enemy of anyone who opposes a particular world as understood by the USA.”92 The
new and shifting contours of the map were re-imagined in just this way. Because the Attack on Iraq was a
war of liberation, the martial face of liberal peace was ever present (and has now been documented in a series
of leaked photographs from Abu Ghraib prison), but in “principle” at least the US army needed to show
restraint. The contradictions abound, but the case I am trying to make is that these contradictions were totally
foreseeable and not inconsistent with the worldview that was coming to fruition in the Battle for Iraq. 
In principle, rule by the threat of death, the type of rule embodied by Saddam Hussein, runs contrary
to principles and techniques of global liberal governance. Hence, Iraqi life, in all of its plurality and
difference, was prized by the US administration – sometimes in explicit contrast to the administration of
Saddam Hussein: “Coalition forces take great care to avoid civilian casualties. The Iraqi regime has done the
opposite. It has deliberately put civilians in harm’s way, and used women and children as human shields. It
has sent execution squads to kill Iraqis who choose freedom over fighting for a brutal regime…”93 President
Bush pledged to “safeguard Muslim holy sites and other protected places in Iraq that are important to the
religious and cultural heritage of Islam and of Iraq.”94 Moreover, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the
fact that the Americans did not constitute an occupying force:
The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new
government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people…Rebuilding Iraq will require a
sustained commitment from many nations, including our own. We will remain in Iraq as
long as necessary and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment
before in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave
behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments…In societies that once bred
fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.95
The important point to note here is that the Iraqi ‘choice’ was subsumed within the framework of the
civilizing processes of globalization – which, of course, was characterized by liberal economic markets,
Western-style institutions, and an approximately secular rule of law. Liberty, in other words, had already
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been defined and, as the quote above makes clear, it was up to Americans to judge when the Iraqis had
attained it. 
But make no mistake: the over-riding message of the day was that American might was justified by
right (not the other way around). Any doubt should have been removed the day that the American marines
took control of Baghdad and in a symbolic gesture pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein. In a moment
of exuberance, prior to the statue’s demise, a US marine draped the American flag over Saddam Hussein’s
head. But, with video cameras rolling and a couple hundred Iraqis assembled to witness the event, this
impulse of bravado was quickly checked. As the New York Times explains, “[h]oping not to send a
politically clumsy signal, the marines quickly stowed the American flag they unfurled at first and replaced
it with an old Iraqi flag.”96 Apparently they did this at the behest of military command. What is significant
about this message, more than its content, is who it was directed at. Iraqi subjectivity wasn’t the only target
of this performance. Interestingly, this moment was repeatedly highlighted by the American media suggesting
that the message was directed at (skeptical) American audiences as well.  
Despite all claims to the contrary, difference and dissent were perhaps the real targets of this war.
In the words of Antonio Negri, “the other that they are trying to crush…is not bin Laden and terrorism [or,
I might add, Saddam Hussein], but rather it is the multitude.”97 Oddly (or not), while Americans were waging
war in the name of liberty across the globe, Venn notes that political repression was returning to the centre.98
This is evident both in terms of the criminalization of dissent and perhaps, more significantly, in the
seemingly innocuous day-to-day practices of surveillance ranging from the monitoring of credit card
transactions and random security checks of vehicles at federal buildings to electronically filing the finger
prints of anyone who comes to the United States with a visa. On the one hand, this is quite commensurate
with the new spatial configurations of the globe – the collapsing of boundaries between the wild and safe
zones. In a world that George Bush characterizes as inhabiting “thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in
the methods of murder…[and] spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs” security measures that
target individuals and groups may be deemed necessary.99 On the other hand, the merging and broadening
of criminal and enemy discourses that these new “security” measures entail may also be considered a threat
– depending on the form of life deemed worth protecting. What happens as these two discourses merge is
that individuals are increasingly measured not only by their actions, but also by their dispositions and intents
such that one’s level of patriotism may, in itself, constitute a security concern. Dillon and Reid comment on
this shift as follows:
What Foucault had already noted in respect of the advent of disciplinary power/ knowledge,
[t]he idea of dangerousness mean[s] that the individual must be considered by society at the
level of his potentialities and not at the level of his actions; not at the level of actual
violations of an actual law, but at the level of the behavioural potentialities they
represented.100
As the discourse of danger expands in this way, the “domain of strategy expands and changes accordingly”
with the result that antiwar protesters increasingly fall under the magnifying scope of the societal gaze.101
Managhan g An Examination of the Identities and Fantasies (Re)Kindled in the Battle for Iraq / 18
Hence, the antiwar protesters’ intentions and the successful communication of these  were key to the
very viability of their campaign. Large public relations firms were hired to assist the mainstream antiwar
groups (who were by and far the majority) get their message across.102 The main message, apart from the fact
that they opposed the war, seemed to be that the antiwar protesters did not pose a threat to the American
identity or way of life. In fact, the leaders of the mainstream organizations capitalized on their patriotic
stance. The carefully worded mission statement of the largest of the antiwar coalitions, Win Without War,
read as follows: “We are patriotic Americans who share the belief that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed
to possess Weapons of Mass Destruction. But we believe that a pre-emptive military invasion of Iraq will
harm national interests.”103 Critique was purposively limited to the wisdom of this particular war. It did not
extend to the goal of disarming Saddam Hussein, intervention in Afghanistan or American participation in
other wars. One of its founding members explained that “[r]ight from the beginning we tried to frame it as
a message that would go down well in broader communities than just the [typical] antiwar crowd.”104
Organizations such as the Sierra Club, the National Organization for Women, or the National Council of
Churches that wanted to join this coalition had to explicitly adopt a “patriotic” and “reasonable” stance.105
According to New York Times columnists Dean Murphy and Kate Zernike, mainstream antiwar
groups, including Win Without War and United for Peace and Justice, “sought to cast their movement as the
loyal opposition.”106 Win Without War encouraged the two million subscribers to its email list to send letters
of support to American troops. Both coalitions tried to distance themselves from “the stereotypical images
of angry flag burners or scruffy anarchists”107 – going so far as excluding certain speakers from their rallies,
marginalizing groups deemed too “left wing and alienating,” and dismissing certain protest tactics.108
Although there was some disagreement in the initial week of war over the merits of a large-scale civil
disobedience campaign (aimed at the disruption of everyday life) to garner national and international media
attention, by the war’s second week both coalitions thought it best to abandon such tactics in order to
accommodate the mood of a country at war. A New York Times article commented, “even the umbrella
organization [United for Peace and Justice] that helped shut down San Francisco last week began its more
mundane protests this week with an announcement that demonstrators interested in thuggery should keep
their distance.”109 Instead its website encouraged its members to light candles or hang yellow ribbons in the
name of peace. All of this in addition to the slogan “Peace is Patriotic” which was written on billboards,
newspaper ads, and protest signs – often against the backdrop of an unfurling American flag – made one
point overwhelmingly clear: The American identity and way of life were quite simply not at stake or even
up for discussion in this particular national debate. The sanctity of the American dream was re-affirmed; the
only remaining question concerned how best to achieve it. 
So successful were the antiwar protesters in communicating this message or in internalizing the
societal gaze – depending on how one chooses to look at it – that rather than being cast out of the a heroic
narrative of a nation pulling together at a time of war, they became central to it. Unlike past instances in
which protesters have been discredited with tearing families, communities, and even the nation apart, this
time they became wrapped up in a narrative celebrating American tolerance, community and freedom of
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expression. The civic anxiety produced by the question, ‘Why would anyone do this to us?’ was all but
denied in the stories that emerged in the liberal mainstream press. Stories printed in the New York Times
repeatedly cast civic solidarity as over-shadowing the pro-war/anti-war divide. One story, for example,
commented that unlike the anger and rigidity that characterized the Vietnam War debate, this time both sides
‘remain on speaking terms’ despite their disagreements: “Thirty years ago, after a decade of escalating war
in Vietnam, slogans like “America, Love It or Leave It” carried an angry punch. This time the mantra of
many New Yorkers seems to be, “Everyone is entitled to their opinion.””110 Another story, written shortly
after the war commenced, noted that with American troops in danger “standing firm has become harder” and
“small doubts have begun to crack the surface of resolve on both sides of the war debate.”111 My favourite
article, which examined the difficulty of protesting in a rural community where everyone knows your name
and where staking your ground may be taken as a personal affront by your neighbour, tells the story of how
one community overcame the tensions within. This story ends with one man who organized an antiwar
demonstration and another who planned a counter-demonstration joining together and leading the community
in the spirit of neighbourliness and conciliation: “Mr. Redalen, carrying his flag, and Mr. Wright, with a
“Wage Peace” sign, walked arm in arm at the head of the line, down Parkway Avenue and to the Lutheran
church, where Mr. Redalen led those gathered for the potluck in a prayer.”112 The message in these stories
and others like them was that the spirit of national solidarity or community was prevailing over more
particular views.  
This message also appears to have gained popular expression as evinced in the comments coming
from the pro-war camp. The New York Times reported, for example, that when asked if antiwar
demonstrations should be permitted, one gentleman, who just finished arguing that the antiwar protests were
counter-productive, responded incredulously, “Oh, of course they should be able to protest, without a doubt.
That’s what we’re fighting for.”113 Similarly, when asked about the war’s supporters, an antiwar organizer
made the comment that “there are a lot of people with very good intentions on both sides.”114 Opinion polls
also reflected the mood of tolerance with 61 percent of Americans saying that antiwar protesters should have
the right to hold protest marches and rallies, a number considerably higher than during the Vietnam War
debate.115 This tentative acceptance of anti-war protesters by the mainstream liberal press and by the general
public, in some ways provided the antiwar movement tremendous success in terms of sheer numbers
involved, with demonstrations bringing together tens of thousands of people from all over the political
spectrum. But, the point remains that by most indications this acceptance was, indeed, conditional. It came
at the cost of more critical questions about the referent object that was being secured – the American identity
and/or way of life – and at the cost of a more radical interrogation of the global ambitions that the Battle for
Iraq betrayed. This is not to say that there were no Americans asking these types of questions, but that the
movement’s very approval and widespread appeal seemed to depend on the sidelining of these issues from
the mainstream debate. Indeed, if the war on Iraq can be viewed as a biopolitical war, one waged over the
terrain of life, then I think that the following quote from William Connolly is particularly apt: “In a highly
structured state, an episodic, juridical politics of dissent against extreme atrocities lapses into a nonpolitics
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of nihilistic consent to the everyday extension of discipline and normalization – the most ominous form
nihilism assumes today.”116 Applied to my essay, I take these words to support my contention that the
mainstream antiwar protests were disturbingly apolitical. Far from disturbing the peace, these protesters left
it – replete with its myriad of violences – intact. 
Perhaps most disturbing is that the antiwar movement itself became caught up in the American dream
– not a thorn in its side, but an integral part of its global quest for peace and justice. Dissent could be
tolerated, even celebrated, so long as it did not challenge the politics of life itself. In the words of one Iraqi
who ran to embrace American soldiers, “You are Americans. You are humanity.”117 And with these words
all the pieces of the American dream came together. The images were captured in the words and pictures of
the New York Times. The Iraqi reaction to the American capture of Baghdad was one of three. For those
dancing in the streets, no interpretation was deemed necessary. For those protesting the American
occupation, they were exercising “their new right to complain – something that often landed them in prison
or worse during Saddam Hussein’s rule.”118 And for the rest – standing in the background, quiet, and
watchful – their reaction was one of, and I kid you not, “muted…euphoria.”119 Even the antiwar protesters
at home were voicing doubts about their own reservations. How could something so good possibly be bad?
But, the very moment that the Battle for Iraq was won was also the moment it was lost. The snapshots of
celebration and victory were just that and could not contain those chaotic (what some might call dangerous)
surplus elements of reality and life that continuously defy capture – i.e., the random possibilities in all of us
that cannot be calculated, targeted, or governed. The kaleidoscope was shaken again – but surely remnants
of the American dream remain.
Conclusion
I have not clearly defined what this dream is or is not. I have only provided suggestions, hints, and perhaps
a rough outline of what this dream may contain. In part, this is because by my understanding a dream is
almost by definition intangible. Its importance lies in what it signifies and not in what it is. Nor have I
provided a definitive statement about what the product of this dream, the shape of the emerging world order,
is or might be. Again, I am not particularly concerned with engaging in a debate about what the world is or
is not. And I will not claim to know. All I can do is try to illuminateaspects of this world that I believe
deserve illuminating and highlight aspects of another truth – where light is seldom brought to bear. What I
am trying to do is expand the scope of the political to the terrain of life and identity and to demonstrate
power’s increasing investment in these biopolitical realms. The Battle for Iraq signifies to me the opposite:
an attempt to cast critical questions about our way of life and the good of the liberal democratic peace outside
the realm of political contestation. The oft-repeated warning of President George W. Bush, “You are either
with us or against us,” captures this exceptionally well.
Hence, I try to illustrate that the promise of a liberal democratic peace that transcends the old
polarities between East and West, North and South, or the West and ‘the Rest’ is not benevolent nor, in its
current guise, is it a universal dream. Rather, I try to show that the choice being offered to us is the product
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of a unique historical vision that I refer to as the American dream – one which is replete with its own
violences and ambitions. I compare this vision with that produced in Spain hundreds of years ago, after the
discovery of America, in order to suggest that the political terrain on which the Battle for Iraq took place is
perhaps much more circumscribed than it appears to us at the present moment. Just as the competing
responses of the Spanish towards the Amerindians, affirmed a singular understanding of the “difference”
between Us and Them that served as the basis for the Westphalian state system, underlying that which
differentiates the opposing sides of the current pro-war/anti-war debate is a very similar worldview. This
particular view conflates American interests and values with human interests and values and allows the
United States and the institutions of global governance to aid, discipline, monitor, and/or intervene in foreign
populations on this basis. Although the new boundaries that are being drawn are much more fluid and porous
(some would even say ‘open’) than those of the classic state system, I am stricken by the extent to which the
separate concerns of state-makers and humanitarians have again conjoined to delimit the spaces of the
political – albeit in profound new ways and with profoundly different effects. 
For instance, it is no longer the case that the state-makers wage war and destruction and the
humanitarians urge peace and life. These polarities no longer really exist as Michael Ignatieff points out that
the new wars are done in the name of life, liberty, and peace. What Ignatieff does not mention is that this
peace, if we can still call it that, is a highly militarized and securitized one. As the olive branch of the liberal
democratic peace is extended to more and more peoples across the globe, the target of power (embedded in
security and governance discourses) is increasingly directed within. Cultural differences are welcomed, even
celebrated, under the umbrella of peace, but simultaneously many of the spaces of our innermost private
identities are over-invested in ways that lead us to cast politics out of the equation of who we are and what
we want. In the era of transcendence, it is through the administering of life – bodies, ambitions, and desires
– that the American dream thrives domestically and gains new footholds across the globe. As Michel
Foucault observed, wars are less frequently waged primarily as a means of ‘deduction’ – i.e., as a means to
appropriate the land, resources, taxes, or labour of a subject population.120 It is more often the case that they
are waged on behalf of a population, a people, or, to use the more encompassing category of the present, a
‘way of life.’ This shift is not simply vernacular as it highlights the productive aspects of modern war – war’s
ability to produce that which it claims to be defending. The American dream cannot be born from a barrel
of a gun; yet, domestically at least and for a specific period of time, this dream was re-imagined, re-produced,
and re-invigorated in the Battle for Iraq.
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